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Abstract 
In this paper we introduce a design methodology for business models from two 
perspectives: the value web perspective and the trust perspective. The value web 
perspective models the creation, distribution, and consumption of things of  economic 
value in a network of multiple enterprises and end-consumers. The goal of the 
methodology is two-fold: (1) to create a common understanding of a business model for 
all actors involved, and (2) to assess the potential profitability of a business model. The 
trust perspective describes how value webs can be expanded with trustworthy control 
procedures to provide for each actor sufficient confidence in each other to enable 
trading. We present a first outline of a formal theory to design trustworthy control 
procedures in the setting of the e3value methodology. 
1.   Introduction 
e-Business development becomes more and more a trans-disciplinary design problem. An 
e-business case should have a sound value proposition, so marketing and business 
economics is an important discipline to take into account. On the other hand, information 
& communication technology (ICT) plays an enabling and critical role: most e-business 
cases are fully dependent on reliable information technology. Additionally, trust, e.g. 
enabled by inter-organizational business processes and document flows, is important to 
consider. 
Stakeholders representing these different disciplines view the similar design problem 
(how to develop a specific e-business case) from different viewpoints. It is widely Jaap Gordijn, Yao-Hua Tan 
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accepted that these different viewpoints result, due to misunderstandings amongst 
stakeholders, in a lack of common understanding of the e-business case to be developed. 
Moreover, stakeholders often represent different enterprises. Since enterprises often do 
not share a common terminology, e.g. because they operate in different markets and have 
other cultures, common understanding an e-business case even decreases. 
One of the contributions of the ICT and business process sciences is a conceptual 
modeling approach for business and ICT development. The activity of conceptual 
modeling refers to formally defining aspects of the physical and social world around us 
for the purpose of understanding and communication [Mylopoulos, 1992]. Describing an 
e-business case formally, may contribute to a better understanding of the case at hand, 
and therefore increases stakeholder’s confidence in such a case. 
Since there are multiple perspectives taken on an e-business case, it is important to use 
multiple description techniques to represent stakeholder viewpoints. A commonly made 
mistake in conceptual modeling is to express all perspectives by only one description 
formalism, leading to unclear and cluttered descriptions of the e-business case at hand, 
thus not contributing to a common understanding. 
In this paper we introduce description techniques for two of such perspectives: the value 
web perspective and the trust perspective. The value web perspective models the creation, 
distribution, and consumption of economic value in a network of multiple enterprises and 
end-consumers. The goal here is two-fold: (1) to create a common understanding of a 
business model for all actors involved, and (2) to assess the potential profitability of a 
business model. In this paper, we focus on common understanding. Profitability 
assessment is extensively discussed in [Gordijn 2002]. It is widely acknowledged that 
trust between trade partners is a key to success of a business relation (see e.g. [Mayer et 
al. 1995], [AMR special issue, 1998]. In particular, in e-business relations where often 
parties do online business with each other without having any previous experience with 
each other, or lack detailed information about one another, trust building is a complicated 
aspect of the relation (see e.g. [McKnight, 2002]). The trust perspective in this paper 
describes how value webs can be expanded with control procedures to provide for each 
actor sufficient confidence in each other to enable trading. In particular, we focus on a 
formal analysis of the control procedures that can be used to develop a theory for 
designing the most appropriate control procedure for a given value web. The long-term 
objective of this research is to subsequently use this theory to extend the e3value 
methodology with a library of heuristic guidelines for selecting the most appropriate 
control procedures for a given value web. The goal of this paper is somewhat more 
modest: It shows how value webs can be related to trust issues. As we will see, trust can 
be seen as a value web itself, and value webs can be used as starting point to design trust 
models. 
Case Study: Letter of Credit 
As case study we use the Letter of Credit. Banks introduced the Letter of Credit 
procedure in order to solve the following problem in international trade. Suppose we have 
a seller in Hong Kong and a buyer in the Netherlands. The agents are geographically far 
apart, and the goods have to be transported by a carrier from the seller to the buyer (we 
assume by sea). On the one hand the seller does not want to ship the goods onto the 
carrier’s vessel (and thereby lose control over them) without first receiving payment from 
the buyer. On the other hand the buyer does not want to pay the seller (and thereby lose 
control over the money) before the goods have been shipped. In other words, the agents 
prefer a simultaneous exchange of the shipment of the goods in return for the money. To 
solve this deadlock situation banks introduced the letter of credit; which is an agreement A Design Methodology for Trust and Value Exchanges in Business Models 
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that the bank of the buyer will arrange the payment for the seller as soon as the seller can 
prove to the bank that he shipped the goods. The bill of lading is issued by the carrier in 
return for the goods that he received from the seller. The United Nations Convention on 
International Multimodal Transport of Goods (CIMTG) describes this function as follows 
[UNCMITG, 1980]: 
Article 10 - Evidentiary effect of the multimodal transport document  
Except for particulars in respect of which and to the extent to which a reservation 
permitted under article 9 has been entered:    
The multimodal transport document shall be prima facie evidence of the taking in 
charge by the multimodal transport operator of the goods as described therein; 
and  
Proof to the contrary by the multimodal transport operator shall not be admissible 
if the multimodal transport document is issued in negotiable form and has been 
transferred to a third party, including a consignee, who has acted in good faith in 
reliance on the description of the goods therein. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on modeling value 
webs, whereas section 3 proposes a way to model trust. In section 4, we elaborate on 
relating value web modeling to trust modeling. Finally, section 5 presents future research 
to be done to connect value web and trust modeling more fundamentally. 
2.   Modeling Value Webs 
The Letter of Credit Procedure can be viewed from multiple viewpoints. Seen from a trust 
perspective, the Letter of Credit Procedure contributes to increasing confidence in reliable 
and fair exchange of goods between actors, who do not know each other in advance. 
From a business value perspective, the Letter of Credit Procedure can be seen as a 
commercial service itself facilitating the sale and delivery of another good or service. If 
we see a value web as a set of actors exchanging things of economic value with each 
other, we can view the Letter of Credit Procedure as an economically valuable service in 
a secondary value web, facilitating a primary value web consisting of actors exchanging 
goods or services. This section discusses an approach called e3value [Gordijn 2001], to 
model value webs, whereas section 3 focuses on the trust perspective. The e3value 
methodology is developed to model a value web consisting of actors who create, 
exchange, and consume things of economic value. It has been used in various industries, 
e.g. the music, finance, internet service provisioning, news and energy industry [Gordijn 
2002]. Moreover, elementary tool-support is available (see 
http://www.cs.vu.nl/~gordijn/research.htm), and advanced tool support is now developed 
in the EC-IST funded project Obelix (see http://obelix.e3value.com). 
2.1  Primary Value Web: Exchanging Goods for a Fee 
Figure 1 shows a value web modeling that a supplier offers some object of value to a 
customer and obtains a fee in return. We keep this value web deliberately simple, to 
explain our formalization (section 2.2 adds trust services for the Letter of Credit 
procedure to this web). 
 Jaap Gordijn, Yao-Hua Tan 
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Figure 1: A Supplier and a Customer Exchanging Objects of Value.  
(Note: The grey area and superimposed text are only for explanatory purposes and are not part of the 
e3value modeling technique itself)  
 
An important concept in a value web is a value object. Such an object is a good, a service, 
a fee or a combination of these, which is of economic value for at least one actor. An 
actor is an entity perceived by itself and its environment as an independent economic and 
often legal entity. The goal of an actor is to make profit (in case of an enterprise) or to 
increase its economic utility (in case of an end-consumer). Actors are related by value 
exchanges, which express the willingness of actors to exchange objects of economic 
value with each other. So, in figure 1 two actors (a supplier and a customer) are willing to 
exchange objects of economic value (a good and a fee) with each other. 
A value web also expresses the notion of economic reciprocity. We assume that actors are 
rational acting economic entities that are only willing to offer a value object if they 
acquire another value object in return that represents for that actor a higher value than the 
one offered. To represent economic reciprocity we employ two constructs. The value port 
construct shows the willingness of actor to offer or to acquire a value object from its 
environment. It allows us to abstract away from internal business processes performed by 
an actor; a port only states that something is offered or requested, not how this is 
accomplished. The value interface construct groups value ports of an actor and states 
atomicity. By this, we mean that an actor is only willing to acquire or to provide a value 
object through a port if and only if it is willing to acquire or to provide value objects 
through all ports of the interface. In other words: the actor is only to exchange objects via 
all ports of its value interface, or none at all. This models economic reciprocity: In figure 
1 it is only possible to exchange a good and a fee in combination and not separately. 
2.2  Secondary Value Web: Letter of Credit 
The value web presented in figure 1 has an important assumption. We assume that if the 
supplier delivers a good to a customer, he always gets paid. The same holds for the 
consumer: If he pays, he obtains the good. This behavior is implied by the semantics of 
value interfaces: It is not possible to obtain a good without paying for it or vice versa. In 
practice, this assumption does not always hold. Suppose that a customer orders a good, 
physically receives the good, but then refuses to pay. Then the semantics of the value 
interfaces are not obeyed. Consequently, mechanisms should be in place, to ensure that 
both value exchanges in figure 1 occur (or none at all). The Letter of Credit is such a 
mechanism, which moreover can be seen as commercial service itself (see figure 2). 
Hence, the primary service of selling a good is expanded with a kind of secondary control 
service, the Letter of Credit procedure, which is specifically tailored to secure the 
interests of the seller A Design Methodology for Trust and Value Exchanges in Business Models 
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Figure 2: Secondary Value Web for Letter of Credit 
 
Figure 2 shows some additional e3value notations such as consumer needs, various kinds 
of dependency paths, and termination bars. A consumer need models the event that an 
actor (e.g. a customer) has a desire that s/he wants to be satisfied and is borrowed from 
standard marketing theory [Kotler 1988]. The other constructs are needed to show which 
exchanges of values occur as a result of a customer need, are explained below. 
First, figure 2 represents that the customer must guarantee that the supplier gets paid for 
the good. This is depicted by the AND-fork (a kind of dependency path, see #1), saying 
that if the consumer has a need for a good, he must exchange values via interface #2 (a 
good for a fee) and via interface #3. The latter is the obtainment of a Letter of Credit, a 
service which ensures that if the supplier ships a good, s/he gets paid.  The customer 
obtains a Letter of Credit from an issuing bank and the customer should pay a fee for this.  
Typically, the issuing bank is in the same country as the customer, but has no branch in 
the supplier’s country. Therefore, the issuing bank needs to involve a corresponding 
bank, which is physically closely related to the supplier.  This corresponding bank 
ensures that the supplier will be paid as soon as the supplier has shipped the good. 
Consequently, the corresponding bank needs to be informed on the actual shipment of a 
good. This is done by an additional actor, the carrier. The carrier is offering a shipping 
service to the supplier, for which the supplier pays. It is the carrier, as a party trusted by 
the corresponding bank, who issues a Bill of Lading, which proves that he received the 
goods from the seller. The carrier gives this Bill of Lading to the seller. As soon as this 
Bill of Lading is presented by the seller to the corresponding bank, then the bank pays the 
fee for the good to the supplier. Hence, this is a kind of secured pre-payment arrangement 
for the seller. 
The dependency path shows that the exchanges via value interfaces #4 and #5 are 
unconditionally related. So, if values are exchanged between supplier and customer, the 
supplier must also exchange values with a carrier for shipping these goods. In other 
words, the supplier cannot obtain his fee for a good (interface #4), without actually 
shipping the good (#5). This conforms to the Letter of Credit procedure: a supplier gets 
paid by the corresponding bank if and only if the supplier can show a Bill of Lading, 
which the supplier can only obtain if he shipped the good. Jaap Gordijn, Yao-Hua Tan 
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Note that the value model only shows who is offering what to whom and expects what in 
return. It does not say anything about the physical flow of value objects. From a physical 
perspective, money flows from a customer to an issuing bank, then to a corresponding 
bank, which finally pays the money to a supplier. Process modeling techniques like Petri 
nets or UML activity diagrams are suitable to express this, but it is not the goal of the 
e3value technique. In contrast, its goal is to clarify which objects of value are offered, and 
the reciprocal objects requested. 
Also note that the Letter of Credit service only secures the interest of the supplier that he 
obtains payment for a delivered good, but that there is no control mechanism in place yet 
that guarantees the customer that s/he will receive the ordered good, or receives a refund 
in case of a lost good (e.g. a shipment insurance). Such an additional service is needed to 
ensure that value exchanges between supplier and consumer are indeed atomic, but is not 
part of this paper. 
3.   Modeling Trust in Control Procedures 
Whereas the forementioned value model presents the Bill of Lading/Letter of Credit 
procedure as a commercial service, we also need to understand how this procedure 
actually works. In addition to that, an important way to create trust in a control 
mechanism is to understand how it works, and how the controls protect you against 
opportunistic behavior of a trading partner in a commercial transaction (see e.g. [Das and 
Teng, 1998]). In this section we formalize what it means to understand a control 
procedure for trust. This is based on earlier work that was introduced in[Tan & Thoen, 
2000] and [Tan & Thoen, 2002].  
According to Article 10 of the CIMTG the Bill of Lading as shipment document reliably 
indicates that the goods have been shipped in international trade procedures. Note that 
this article has a normative element. Whether the Bill of Lading is evidence does not 
depend so much on whether a person is psychologically convinced by it, but the law 
simply stipulates that everybody involved in a letter of credit procedure should consider 
this document as sufficient evidence. We use the conditional operator ⇒P, which denotes 
‘reliably indicates’, to formalize the following so-called evidence rule: 
BoL ⇒P Shipped  (Evidence Rule)  (1) 
This is read as ‘In the context of procedure P, the Bill of Lading reliably indicates that the 
goods were shipped’. We assume that the conditional ⇒P has the following axioms as 
defined in [Jones and Sergot, 1996] 
(A ⇒P B) ∧ (A ⇒P C)) → (A ⇒P (B ∧ C))  (2) 
((A ⇒P B) ∧ (C ⇒P B)) → ((A ∨ C) ⇒P B) (3) 
and the following inference rules 
If |- A ↔ B, then |- (C ⇒P A) ↔ (C ⇒P B)  (4) 
If |- A ↔ B, then |- (A ⇒P C) ↔ (B ⇒P C)  (5) 
Note that the modus ponens inference rule does not hold for ⇒P, hence it is much weaker 
than material implication. The evidence relation is not a causal relation. Just as smoke 
does not cause fire, the bill of lading does not cause shipment.   
We described the evidence rule and the procedure in an objective manner, i.e. in terms of 
objective facts such as ‘BoL’ and ‘Shipped’. For the actual execution of the procedure, 
however, the mental states of the agents involved are equally important. If one of the A Design Methodology for Trust and Value Exchanges in Business Models 
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agents does not believe the facts, or something went wrong, e.g. an agent did not receive 
the Bill of Lading, then the procedure does not work. Hence, we cannot simply use 
objective facts like ‘BoL’ and ‘Shipped’ for modeling the mental states of the agents, but 
we have to use subjective beliefs about such facts to model the mental state of the agents. 
To model these belief states of agents, we use epistemic operators such as Biϕ, which 
denotes that agent i believes ϕ, and Kiϕ, which denotes that agent i knows ϕ. If agent b 
believes the Bill of Lading, then we represent this by the formula BiBoL. This belief 
depends on the agent’s belief that the document is not forged, i.e., that the document 
comes from a trustworthy source. Similarly, BiShipped means that the agent i believes 
that shipment of the goods took place. The Ki and Bi operators have the usual axioms and 
inference rules (see [Fagin et al., 1995]). 
Ki Axioms: 
a) Ki(ϕ →ψ) → (Kiϕ → Kiψ)      (K axiom for Ki) 
b) Kiϕ → ϕ      ( T   A x i o m )  
c) Kiϕ → KiKiϕ 
d) ¬Kiϕ → Ki¬Kiϕ 
Bi Axioms: 
a) Bi(ϕ→ψ) → (Biϕ → Biψ)      (K axiom for Bi) 
b) Biϕ →¬Bi¬ϕ 
c) Biϕ → BiBiϕ 
d) ¬Biϕ→ Bi¬Biϕ 
and the following inference rules: 
a) if ϕ and ϕ→ψ, then ψ    
b) if |- ϕ , then |- Kiϕ and |- Biϕ    (Necessitation  rules) 
We model the fact that an agent understands the evidence rule of the procedure with the 
following formula.  
Ki(BiBoL ⇒P BiShipped)    (Epistemic  Evidence  Rule)  (6) 
This formula says that agent i knows that, if he believes the Bill of Lading, then 
according to the procedure P he has a good reason to believe that the goods are shipped. 
Note the importance of the procedural setting here. Agent i knows that by law he is 
supposed to consider the bill of lading as sufficient evidence for shipment. We use here 
the knowledge operator, because procedures or legal texts are non-empirical information 
(like the rules of a game, or mathematics). In other words, these are not empirical data 
about which you can make incorrect observations. You either know this or not, but there 
is nothing in between, while you can get misleading information about empirical facts 
such as a bill of lading or shipment. Hence, we use the Bi operator to represent the belief 
in these facts.  
It is a general principle in most legal systems that its norm subjects are supposed to know 
the norms. This can be represented by an obligation for the norm subjects to ‘ought to 
know’. The norm in Article 10 expresses that everybody who uses the letter of credit 
procedure ought to know that the Bill of Lading reliably indicates that the goods were 
shipped is formalized as, which can be formalized as follows.  
OiKi(BiBoL ⇒P B iShipped), for all agents i  (Obligatory Knowledge of the Evidence 
Rule) (7) Jaap Gordijn, Yao-Hua Tan 
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Where the deontic operator Oi is the standard deontic logic (SDL) operator, and Oip 
means that p is obliged. We have the usual SDL axioms and inference rules (see e.g. 
[Meyer and Wieringa, 1993]). 
Oi Axioms: 
a) Oi(ϕ→ψ) → (Oiϕ → Oiψ)      (K axiom for Oi) 
b) Oiϕ →¬Oi¬ϕ 
and the following inference rules: 
a) if ϕ and ϕ→ψ, then ψ    
b) if |- ϕ , then |- Oiϕ     (Necessitation  rule) 
The idea of rule (7) is that an agent cannot use the argument that he did not know rule (6) 
as justification for violating an obligation. In other words, if agent i has received the Bill 
of Lading but did not pay for the goods on time, then agent i cannot justify his violation 
of the obligation to pay for the goods by saying that he did not know that the goods have 
been already shipped. Agent i ought to have known that receiving the Bill of Lading 
reliably indicates that the goods were shipped.  
The last issue that we have to address is the shared knowledge aspect of trust. The letter 
of credit procedure is only trustworthy for the seller if he knows about all the other parties 
involved, e.g. the buyer, the buyer’s bank etc, that they will accept the bill of lading as 
proof of shipment. In other words, the seller has to know that the evidence rule is 
obligatory knowledge for all the other parties. We model this by the following formula: 
Ki(Oj(Kj(BjBoL ⇒P BjShipped))) for all agents j ≠ I  (9) 
The understanding of the procedure is modeled by the fact that the rules 6, 7 and 9 are 
part of the agent’s mental state. In other words, BiBoL by itself only models that the 
agent believes the written content of the Bill of Lading. Understanding the complete 
functionality of the Bill of Lading requires a lot more. The agent has to know (1) all the 
consequences and functions of the Bill of Lading, and  (2) the agent has to know what he 
and other agents are supposed to know about these consequences. In particular, this 
shared knowledge is essential for trust creation between the agents of a trading 
community.  
4.   Value Modeling and Trust Modeling 
In [Bons et al., 1997] and [Lee and Bons, 1996] a set of auditing principles is introduced 
for trustworthy trade procedures in international trade. The problem in international trade 
is that you often have very little information about your potential trade partner. The 
underlying idea is that if trade procedures are compliant with these auditing principles, 
then these procedures create enough trust for people to trade. An example of such an 
auditing principle is the following: 
If Role 1 cannot witness the performance of a counter-activity, another Role 3 should 
testify the completion of Role 2’s activity if the agent playing Role 2 is not trusted by the 
agent playing Role 1. This document must be received by Role 1 before the execution of 
its primary activity, and the agent playing Role 3 should be trusted by the agent playing 
Role 1. 
This general principle can be applied to the earlier example of the seller in Hong Kong 
and the buyer in the Netherlands. The first condition, that the buyer (Role 1) cannot A Design Methodology for Trust and Value Exchanges in Business Models 
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witness the shipment of the goods, holds. And the second condition that the seller (Role 
2) is not trusted by the buyer (Role 1), holds as well. (We said that the buyer does not 
want to pay before shipment of the goods). The solution that the general auditing 
principle prescribes is the introduction of a third agent (Role 3) that testifies (using a 
document) that the goods have been shipped. The buyer (Role 1) should have received 
this document before the seller is paid.  
This general principle, therefore, imposes a constraint on the letter of credit procedure we 
described in the previous section. The corresponding bank will only accept the Bill of 
Lading when it is issued by an independent third party, i.e. the carrier has to issue it and 
not the seller. Hence, we only have that BiBoL is true, if the Bill of Lading was issued by 
an independent trusted third party. In other words, Article 10 only makes sense if the 
CIMTG complies with this auditing principle, which is indeed the case. 
This auditing principle can be analyzed with the formal concepts that we introduced in 
section 3. More importantly, this formalization provides a basis to develop a theory that 
can be used to explain how control procedures create trust. This theory can then be used 
to design for a particular primary value web the control procedure which is most adequate 
to create trust for a specific agent. For example, from the perspective of the buyer the 
letter of credit creates no trust about the actual delivery of the goods by the carrier. Other 
control procedures could be used to secure the interests of the buyer. For example, an 
insurance at least secures the financial risks of the buyer (who already pre-paid the goods 
in the letter of credit situation!) in case the goods are damaged by the carrier. Hence, the 
formal analysis can be used to develop a theory to design the most appropriate secondary 
control value web to secure the interests of a specific agent in the primary value. 
5.   Conclusions 
Value models and trust models are two perspectives on an e-business case. A value model 
shows which actors are involved and which objects of economic value are exchanged 
between these actors. The e3value methodology assumes that these exchanges always 
occur, or none at all. In other words, there are no actors who are committing a fraud, or 
other mishaps which may result in failed exchanges of value. 
Consequently, to put an e-business idea into practice, mechanisms need to be in place 
which ensure that committed exchanges of value actually occur. In general, such 
mechanisms will based on trustworthy control procedures. Two interesting observations 
were made about these control procedures. First, trust-increasing procedures themselves 
can be seen as viable commercial value-added services with a corresponding value model. 
We called such value models secondary, because they facilitate the exchange of values in 
another, primary, value model. Relating a secondary value model to enhance trust to a 
primary value model goes via the value exchanges of this primary model; these are the 
exchanges which need to be secured by trust-services. Second, a theory is needed about 
trust procedures and how to design them for specific value models. Just as the design 
methodology requires principles for the design of the primary value models, it also 
requires control specific principles for the design of the secondary trust services value 
models. Here we made a first attempt to develop such a theory for the design of the 
secondary trust services value models.  
In future research we plan to further develop the formal theory about auditing principles 
for trust building for designing the most appropriate control procedure to extend a given 
value web. The long-term objective is to use this theory to extend the e
3value Jaap Gordijn, Yao-Hua Tan 
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methodology with a library of heuristic guidelines for selecting the most appropriate 
control procedures for a given value web. 
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